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Beyond the vertical: An evolving framework for understanding the governance 
of private standards initiatives standards in the agrifood chain 
The significance of private standards and associated local level initiatives in agrifood 
value chains are increasingly recognised.  However whilst issues related to 
compliance and impact at the smallholder or worker level have frequently been 
analysed, the governance implications in terms of how private standards affect 
national level institutions, public, private and non-governmental, have had less 
attention.  This article applies an extended value chain framework for critical analysis 
of Private Standards Initiatives (PSIs) in agrifood chains, drawing on primary research 
on PSIs operating in Kenyan horticulture (Horticulture Ethical Business Initiative and 
KenyaGAP). The paper explores the legislative, executive and judicial aspects of 
governance in these southern PSIs highlighting how different stakeholders shape 
debates and act with agency. It is argued that governance is exercised ‗beyond the 
vertical‘ in that one can identify wider horizontal processes of governance, including 
how the scope of key debates is constructed (especially in legislative governance) but 
analysis of executive governance emphasises the dominant role of the lead buyers.   
 
Key words: Kenya, private standards, governance, value chain analysis 
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Beyond the vertical? Using value chains and governance as a 
framework to analyse private standards initiatives in agri-food 
chains 
 
 
Trade in agrifood products is increasingly characterised by global supply chains 
dominated by agribusiness that require suppliers to comply with an ever-growing set 
of standards to secure access to markets.  Often, these standards take the form of 
voluntary standards and codes developed and overseen by new constellations of actors 
from the private and non-governmental sectors, working in collaboration in private 
standards initiatives (PSIs).  PSIs represent a new form of agrifood governance which 
present questions related to sustainability and democratic legitimacy.  
 
What is particularly interesting is that PSIs are now emerging in the global South as 
well as the North where, in the context of managing risk in global chains, they were 
first initiated.  Southern PSIs focusing on food safety and quality include ChileGAP 
and KenyaGAP, where producers have developed their own interpretation of Good 
Agricultural Practice which they have benchmarked to the GlobalGAP protocol 
(Garbutt and Coetzer 2005; Garbutt 2007).  There are also examples of southern PSIs 
in the field of labour codes of practice, such as the Wine Industry Ethical Trade 
Association (WIETA) in South Africa and Horticulture Ethical Business Initiative 
(HEBI) in Kenya (Barrientos 2007; Dolan and Opondo 2005).  
 
There has been very little empirical analysis of PSIs located in the global South.  This 
paper draws on preliminary findings from an ongoing project on private standards in 
the agrifood chain in the horticulture sector in Kenya where leading European 
retailers and other key buyers are sourcing cut flowers and vegetables in order to 
contribute to filling this empirical gap.
1
  Our framework for analysis of PSIs (set out 
originally in Tallontire 2007) focuses on governance and potential institutional 
impacts within the agri-food sector using an extended form of value chain analysis 
(VCA) which emphasises ‗horizontal‘ as well as ‗vertical‘ dimensions of governance.  
By this we mean that the framework looks beyond actors directly involved in 
commodity exchange and includes the range of actors that may govern value chains 
and related standards beyond buyers and suppliers such as civil society organisations, 
donors and workers and their representatives.  We compare the horizontal and vertical 
governance aspects of two locally based private standards initiatives that have 
emerged in the agrifood sector in Kenya: the Horticulture Ethical Business Initiative 
(HEBI) and KenyaGAP, with respect to the way in which standards are developed and 
by whom (legislative governance), how compliance is monitored and assessed 
                                                 
1
 The authors gratefully acknowledge funding from the UK‘s Economic and Social Research Council 
and Department for International Development, for the project Governance Implications of Private 
Standards Initiatives in Agri-Food Chains, grant ref: RES-167-25-0195. 
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(judicial governance) and processes of standard implementation and the different tools 
that are used by the PSI to ensure that standards are met (executive governance). 
 
The Kenyan horticulture sector is an interesting locus for this research due to the keen 
interest of donors, the institutional experimentation that has been undertaken and the 
importance of the sector to the country‘s exports.  In this paper we have considered 
two PSIs together, not only because they are operating in the same sector in the same 
country and are therefore inter-related, but also because it helps to put the relative 
success or failure of the different initiatives into context of the wider structural 
dynamics evident in the chain. 
 
We start by briefly discussing the growth and origins of PSIs in agri-food chains. Our 
conceptual framework is then set out.  Next we explore the different dimensions of 
governance at play in two Kenyan PSIs drawing on the empirical research we have 
undertaken in Kenya and in Europe.   The concluding section reflects on the dynamics 
of governance in the two initiatives and the way in which different kinds of power 
have shaped the stories of the initiatives. We argue that one needs to look beyond the 
vertical aspects of governance, to explore the role of actors outside of the value chain 
to fully appreciate the potential role of southern PSIs.  However, our analysis 
indicates that the extension of governance ‗beyond the vertical‘ is limited to only 
certain aspects of governance.  Moreover, whilst PSIs may offer potential for 
standards to be developed, meet the needs of and be applicable to a wider range of 
stakeholders, much of the power resides with actors downstream, that is the buyers. 
 
Private forms of regulation in agri-food chains  
The use of private forms of regulation such as standards has become a hot topic in 
agrifood, trade and value chains literature in which the increasing significance of 
private standards in comparison to public standards, in developed and developing 
countries, has been mapped (for example by Giovannucci and Ponte 2005; Busch and 
Bain 2004; Henson and Reardon 2005).  There has been considerable discussion 
about the use of private standard by supermarkets in the context of their global 
sourcing policies (Vorley 2003; Dolan and Humphrey 2000; Busch et al 2005).  
Important developments have been the insistence by certain retailers that suppliers are 
certified against the GlobalGAP
2
  standard or other standards for good agricultural 
practice as part of their efforts to ensure the supply of safe food to consumers 
(Humphrey 2006) and, in certain markets, increased vigilance with regard to the 
welfare of workers and adherence to labour rights, particularly the UK where several 
supermarkets are members of the Ethical Trading Initiative
3
 (Barrientos 2007; Hughes 
et al 2007).  As Giovannucci and Ponte note, ‗standards are thus being set outside the 
                                                 
2
Until recently known as EurepGAP, this initiative started in 1997 when retailers belonging to the 
Euro-Retailer Produce Working Group (EUREP) to develop standards for Good Agricultural Practice 
(GAP). In particular European markets, notably the UK and the Netherlands, it has become the 
minimum requirement for producers wishing to sell through the multiple retailers.  . 
3
 The ETI is ‗an alliance of companies, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and trade union 
organisations‘ which aims ‗to promote and improve the implementation of corporate codes of practice 
which cover supply chain working conditions‘ (www.ethicaltrade.org). 
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classic boundaries of governmental and intergovernmental authority and through 
amorphous alliances of corporations, NGOs, and civil society groups that tend to 
reach agreements on the model of collective bargaining‘ (Giovanucci and Ponte 2005: 
298).
4
 
 
Private Standards Initiatives in the South5 
The emergence of southern-based PSIs has been cheered enthusiastically from many 
quarters. For some, private standards could be usefully aligned with public sector 
monitoring and enforcement functions for reasons of efficiency or to take advantage 
of potential creative synergies between private and public standards development, 
inspection and sanctions systems (FIAS 2005).  Enthusiasm for PSIs has come from 
another quarter, founded upon their potential, especially when they involve a variety 
of stakeholders, localising standards, improving farmer and worker well-being and 
providing a space for participation for previously unheard groups (NRET 2002; 
Barrientos, Dolan and Tallontire 2003; Pattberg 2006), and thereby embodying 
deliberative democracy (Fuchs and Kalfagianni forthcoming). O‘Rourke summarises 
the potential in particular of non-governmental forms of regulation: ‗they offer the 
potential of opening up and strengthening regulatory systems, and bringing in new 
voices and mechanisms for motivating improvements in global supply chains‘ 
(O‘Rourke 2006: 911). 
 
However, some warnings have been sounded with respect to the power that private 
initiatives embody. They may be an instrument through which the private sector can, 
in the words of Busch and Bain ‗reorganize aspects of the market to better suit its 
needs‘ in the context of a retreating state (2004: 322). Utting warns that structural 
factors, specifically ‗ongoing economic liberalization‘, are likely to play an important 
role in shaping the nature of the regulation of business (2005: iii). Purchasing 
practices and supply chain management in agri-food chains are likely to affect the 
way in which rules are formulated and put into practice (Taylor 2005; Raworth 2004).  
Retailers for example maintain control through discursive power to frame the debate 
and have ‗the power to determine which stakeholders are called to the bargaining 
table and whose voices are validated‘ (Dolan and Opondo 2005: 97) and there are 
risks that ‗local multi-stakeholder approaches may simply replicate and reinforce local 
gender norms‘ (Tallontire, Dolan, Smith and Barrientos 2005: 569).  Indeed even the 
optimism about PSIs is often hedged and subject to numerous case-specific caveats. 
The potential of PSIs, whether to improve efficiency or governance, is conditional and 
largely untested (Courville 2003; O‘Rourke 2003).  Importantly, there is a dearth of 
empirical understanding in a Southern as opposed to a Northern context and beyond 
international standards.  
 
                                                 
4
 We are using the term ‗private standards‘ to cover all standards set outside the realms of public sector.  
We have included ‗multi-stakeholder‘ initiatives under the broad rubric of private standards initiatives 
to distinguish them clearly from mandatory standards and so permit analysis of the extent to which 
initiatives permit true multi-stakeholder dialogue and action.  
5
 This section draws considerably from Tallontire 2007 where the literature is more fully discussed. 
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An analytical framework 
In our earlier paper (Tallontire 2007) we set out the areas of literature which may 
provide ideas for a conceptual framework to guide empirical analysis. The entry point 
was Value Chain Analysis (VCA) as it is focused on the structures of international 
trade and the material context in which PSIs are emerging. There are four generally 
agreed aspects to value chain analysis, consideration of the : a) input-output structure, 
b) territorial configuration, c) governance structure and d) institutional framework 
(originally Gereffi 1995; and summarized by Ponte 2002, Nielson and Pritchard 2009).  
A key feature of some applications of VCA that makes it particularly useful for the 
analysis of standards is its concern with governance, particularly chain governance, i.e. 
how key players ‗drive‘ the chain (Gereffi 1994).   
 
Gereffi distinguished between two types of governance structures: producer-driven 
and buyer-driven.  In a buyer-driven value chain, typical in the agri-food sector, large 
retailers or brand-name companies make the key decisions about the nature of 
activities and actors in the chain without actually owning any manufacturing facilities 
themselves.
6
 A theoretical development regarding buyer-driven chains by Gereffi et al 
(2005) has sought to refine governance in terms of different forms of relationship 
between nodes in the chain, focusing on the transfer of information between the buyer 
and the first tier supplier, the extent to which information regarding buyer 
requirements can be codified and the capabilities of the supply base. 
7
 
 
In contrast, Gibbon and Ponte (2005) have pointed to the need to consider ‗whole 
chain governance‘ rather than considering the largely economic dimensions of 
‗functional leadership‘ and so  relate chain governance to ‗broader narratives about 
quality circulating within society more generally‘ (Ponte and Gibbon 2005: 3). They 
remind us that there are other important players and factors as well as the lead agents, 
who may have some influence on the ‗drivers‘, such as government bodies, civil 
society organisations and different categories of consumers (the latter especially in the 
context of product differentiation). They stress that value chains do not operate in ‗an 
institutional and regulatory vacuum‘, and seek to incorporate international trade 
policy and the values and views of society, including consumers.    
 
Gibbon and Ponte (2005) link convention theory and analysis of quality conventions 
to their understanding of (whole chain) governance in value chains which helps 
broaden and contextualise VCA.  However, it is less useful at the producer end of the 
value chain and with respect to national standards initiatives particularly the shifting 
dynamics between the private sector, the state and civil society in the context of 
specific PSIs, in contrast to the standards themselves.  We need new tools to consider 
horizontal governance, i.e. how these new regulatory institutions involve and affect 
                                                 
6
 More recent work has suggested that there are more types of governance than this dualism implies 
and different chains in the same market for a commodity may exhibit different levels of driveness, that 
is, not all buyers are lead firms in the same way.   
7
 Their distinction between ‗market‘, ‗relational‘, ‗modular‘, ‗captive‘ and ‗hierarchy‘ forms of 
governance has been used by analysts concerned with governance in fair trade value chains for 
example (Barrientos and Smith 2007; Reed 2009). 
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others formally or informally involved in setting, monitoring, improving or 
implementing such standards at the national level.   
 
Increasingly horizontal aspects of governance in VCA are gaining recognition.  
Indeed many researchers have abandoned VCA and have looked to Global Production 
Network theories to consider the role of other actors that may shape the nature of 
inclusion and exclusion in value chains (see for example Coe et al 2008). Within 
VCA, Bolwig et al (2008) have developed a framework for integrating gender, 
environmental and poverty dimensions into VCA; earlier Barrientos et al (2003) 
linked the gender economy to VCA to explore the often neglected employment 
aspects of value chains.  More recently, Neilson and Pritchard have sought to re-assert 
the importance of an institutional dimension to VCA, arguing that recent 
concentration on governance has meant that ‗the approach has little to say on the 
complex questions‘ related to the differences in how value chains operate across 
geographical locations and how governance and institutions within value chains are 
‗co-produced‘ in a context of ‗struggle‘ (2009: 8-9).   
 
We argue that it is necessary to widen the perspective beyond vertical chain 
governance, i.e. relations between buyers and suppliers, if we are to understand the 
broader implications of PSIs beyond the actors directly involved in the agri-food 
value chain.  In order to capture the interplay between the different actors involved in 
PSIs, we have looked to how Kaplinsky and Morris (2002) use the ‗lens of civic 
governance‘, and ‗the separation of powers‘ to reconsider governance in a value chain 
context.  They ask who makes the rules and how and associated discourse (legislative 
aspects); how conformity is assessed (judicial) and management of participants 
including the use of incentives and sanctions (executive).  They illustrate this by 
exploring how parties internal and external to the chain are involved, comparing with 
respect to legislative governance, for example, standards on delivery times (internally 
determined) with environmental standards (often externally determined), highlighting 
that there may be several actors involved in different aspects of governance.  For 
Kaplinksy and Morris (2002) uncovering the multiplicity of actors was useful in 
identifying where inefficiencies in the chain may occur.  In the context of PSIs, the 
separation of powers helps to take the analysis of governance beyond a concern with 
the vertical dimensions, to include the role of parties other than lead buyers.  As we 
argue below, however, it is important to get beyond the visible or direct involvement 
of different actors in governance to also consider more invisible or discursive forms 
of power.   
 
Thus, analysis under the rubric of legislative governance is concerned with the origin 
of the standard, exploring the links it has with other standards, both in the public and 
private domains. Importantly it is concerned with identifying who is involved, and 
those who may be excluded.  Is this an industry-only or is it multi-stakeholder? And 
what is the basis for participation: is there a constitution outlining the different kinds 
of organisation to be represented?  Under judicial governance, the focus is on how 
compliance is monitored and assessed.  Are there formal audit procedures?  What is 
the relationship with other systems of inspection and conformity assessment, 
including public sector systems or extra-territorial systems?  Who is able to audit and 
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what kinds of auditing systems are favoured?  Executive governance is about the 
processes of standard implementation and the different tools that are used by the PSI 
to ensure that standards are met.  What does non-compliance mean for members?  
How far down the chain are standards expected to be met?  What is the relationship 
with actors upstream with regard to efforts to promote implementation of the standard?   
 
An important part of our framework is mapping who is involved in each of these three 
governance realms, particularly focusing on the extent and modalities of participation 
and representation of key stakeholders.  This is particularly useful for understanding 
the outputs of politics, the decisions made and rules set and to explore the 
characteristic of participants.  However, this yields a fairly static picture, there is a 
need to supplement this picture of the structures of PSIs with an understanding of the 
more subtle processes by which new forms of governance are legitimated, i.e. the way 
in which power can be expressed and potentially gained through the shaping of ideas 
and discourse.  Indeed, governance concerns not only direct power over actors in the 
chain or their power as a result of their structural position, but also their discursive 
power, or ability to frame the debate (Fuchs and Lederer 2007).
8
  
 
Thus the preliminary analysis of legislative, executive and judicial governance must 
be overlaid with an assessment of different dimensions of power, both overt and softer, 
hidden forms of power.  This can be done through considering the discourse of the 
key actors, the way in which the actors interact or the struggles that may occur (as 
highlighted by Neilson and Pritchard [2009]), and through this explore who may act 
with agency as opposed to being subject to the power relations within the PSIs.
9
 Thus, 
we aim to explore the ways in which the structural characteristics of a particular value 
chain, the agency of key actors, and the associated discourses interact, are contested 
and shaped, specifically in relation to the emergence of private standards.  An 
important question that must be addressed is whether the PSI represents a form of 
‗control at a distance‘ (Gibbon and Ponte 2005) on the part of lead buyers or whether 
it has its own, locally negotiated dynamic.   
 
PSIs and governance in Kenyan horticulture 
 
Our empirical research has involved three main elements through which we have 
sought to explore the perspectives of different actors along and associated with the 
Kenya-Europe horticulture value chain.  We have conducted over fifty key informant 
interviews in Europe, predominantly the UK, and in Kenya, including representatives 
of Kenyan government, horticultural producers, retailers, private standards bodies, 
NGOs and trade unions.  Several Kenyan stakeholders also participated in three 
                                                 
8
 A discursive power approach tends to focus on ‗the ideational dimension‘ of politics and policy and 
explores how ‗discursive power shapes perceptions and identifies‘ (Fuchs and Lederer 2007: 9).  In 
some approaches to discursive power, power can become anonymised, which, as Fuchs and Leder (ibid) 
note, can mean that one ignores the intentions behind power and indeed the role of actors themselves.  
However, a Gramscian interpretation of discursive power highlights the role of agency.   
9
 Riisgaard (2008) highlights the importance of considering agency beyond the buyers and suppliers in 
her analysis of the agency of labour  organisations in the Kenyan horticulture sector. 
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workshops held in Nairobi in September 2008 which sought to map out different 
perspectives concerning private standards and their implementation in Kenya and the 
trajectories of different PSIs.  This was complemented by twenty nine focus group 
discussions with workers employed in horticultural firms which are implementing a 
range of private social and GAP standards and eighteen FGDs with smallholders 
which have been implementing standards demanded by supermarkets (mostly 
GlobalGAP in the case of smallholders)
10
. Through the worker and smallholder FGDs 
we sought to explore awareness of standards and participation and involvement (if 
any) of workers or smallholders in debates or action relating to private standards and 
local PSIs. 
 
Amongst sub-Saharan countries, Kenya is a significant exporter of horticultural 
produce (fresh fruit and vegetables and flowers).  Horticulture exports, including 
flowers, were over US$330 million in 2002; 135,000 people were directly employed 
and 25,000 smallholders involved in the sector (World Bank 2005), with annual 
growth rates over 10%, by 2006 exports were over US$ 550 million (Republic of 
Kenya 2007).  The sector has been the arena for a considerable number of PSIs and 
seems to have been a testing ground for different institutional arrangements with 
regard to standards and market linkages by donors, NGOs and the private sector.  Two 
kinds of standard have been prominent: labour standards and standards for good 
agricultural practice (GAP), both of which have been implemented as a result of buyer 
pressure in the agri-food chain.  Pressure from buyers, together with civil society 
pressure in the case of labour standards, has resulted in the emergence of two Kenyan 
PSIs: (a) KenyaGAP, and (b) Horticulture Ethical Business Initiative (HEBI), 
background to which is found in the Boxes 1 and 2. 
 
Box 1: KenyaGAP 
 
KenyaGAP is an initiative to produce a ‗locally-owned‘ standard that has been 
benchmarked with GlobalGAP. 
 
GlobalGAP, formerly EurepGAP, was established in 1996 as an initiative by retailers 
belonging to the Euro-Retailer Fresh Produce Working Group (EUREP) to develop 
standards for Good Agricultural Practice (GAP). It was a response to consumer 
concerns and European legislation on food safety and also aimed to fill a regulatory 
gap.  Systems such as GlobalGAP are an effort to demonstrate that a retailer has put 
in place appropriate precautions to ensure that safe food is delivered to the consumer 
(Fulponi 2006: 9).  For UK retailers in particular it is hoped that improved systems for 
GAP all along the supply chain would offer a due diligence defence for retailers under 
the UK Food Safety Act 1990 (Graffham, Karehu and Macgregor 2007).  In particular 
European markets, notably the UK, Netherlands and Switzerland, certification 
according to GlobalGAP has become the minimum requirement for producers wishing 
to sell through the multiple retailers (Henson and Reardon 2005; Jaffee 2005) and 
retailers outside of Europe have recently become members.   
 
                                                 
10
 The worker FGDs took place July and December 2008 in Kiambu and Nakuru Districts and the 
smallholder FGDs took place between July-October 2008 in Maragua, Kirinyaga and Meru. 
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In Kenya the larger producers were able to meet the GlobalGAP standard 
independently or by virtue of compliance with the Kenya Flower Council‘s (KFC) 
standard that was already benchmarked with GlobalGAP.  However, it was more 
challenging for small to medium producers of horticultural products, indeed there 
were concerns in the media, in the industry and across government that the standard 
would lead to the exclusion of small producers from these supply chains.  This was  
particularly heightened in 2004 as GlobalGAP‘s deadline for compliance by members 
and their suppliers drew closer.  This led to the establishment of a National Technical 
Working Group in late 2004 to explore the potential for a KenyaGAP standard that 
would be more attuned to local conditions.  Led by FPEAK (the Fresh Producer 
Exporters Association of Kenya), whose members include more medium and small 
scale operators compared to KFC, KenyaGAP was private sector led.  However, 
government bodies have also played an important role in the discussions to redevelop 
the FPEAK standard to become KenyaGAP.  Donors such as Coleacp PIP and USAID 
have helped with finance and advice and technical assistance and training was offered 
by NGOs and ‗experts‘ (Garbutt 2007; Humphrey 2008).   
 
KenyaGAP achieved benchmarked status in 2007 but few, if any, export companies 
have sought KenyaGAP certification. FPEAK are now working on a revised standard, 
KenyaGAP Local in collaboration with the Kenyan Bureau of Standards and are 
starting to audit their members against the KenyaGAP standard, formerly compliance 
with the code was not a condition of membership in FPEAK.  
 
 
 
Box 2: Horticulture Ethical Business Institute (HEBI)  
HEBI was registered as a legal entity in 2003 as a result of a local and international 
civil campaign against workers‘ rights violations in horticulture and then interventions 
from the UK‘s Ethical Trading Initiative (itself a PSI with stakeholders from the 
private sector, NGOs and trade unions) and donors (the UK‘s Department for 
International Development [DFID] and the Dutch Embassy).  In anticipation of the 
ETI delegation and ‗in fear of losing Kenya‘s most significant market, rival Kenyan 
stakeholders came together for the first time to lay the groundwork for the formation 
of HEBI‘ (Dolan and Opondo 2005: 91).   
 
A multi-stakeholder approach to code implementation was initiated and a tri-partite 
Stakeholders Steering Committee (SSC) was formed comprised of members from 
Kenyan civil society organizations and trade associations/employers, observers 
(including donors and some UK-registered NGOs), and government representatives.  
The aim was to include unions but have they did not accept the invitation.  The SCC 
had two objectives to a) ‗harmonise stakeholder interests and involvement and to 
develop a credible and participatory social audit framework acceptable to all 
stakeholders including buyer markets‘ and b) ‗to use the developed social audit 
framework to establish the actual situation on the ground and report back to the 
Stakeholders‘ (HEBI 2005). 
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The intervention of the ETI and donor funding helped establish HEBI and by 2005 it 
had undertaken the following activities (HEBI 2005):  
 Developed a uniform social code of practice, which translated the ETI Base 
Code and other significant social codes into the Kenyan context, through 
reference to Kenyan labour law and drawing on good practice established 
from research and HEBI audits 
 Trained up to 40 local auditors in Participatory Social Auditing (PSA)  
 Social ethics stakeholder workshop, planned to take place annually 
 A pilot social audit took place on eight farms and the findings were presented 
at a stakeholder workshop (January 2004). 
 
One of the aspirations of HEBI, as expressed in its terms of reference for the 
development of a strategic plan (2006), is ‗the formation of an independent 
association of social auditors‘; it also indicates that it offers the services of social 
auditors.  This role as an audit body is in addition to objectives related to awareness-
raising amongst workers, promotion of PSA methodology, being the focal point for 
stakeholder engagement regarding national labour standards and the development of a 
complaints handling procedure for the industry. 
 
However, currently HEBI has no staff and no funding and exists, if at all, only as a 
board. 
 
In the following sections we discuss the two initiatives using the legislative, judicial 
and executive framework and also highlight the way in which power and agency have 
been exercised by particular stakeholder groups. 
 
Legislative governance 
First of all we consider legislative governance with respect to the origin of the 
standard, its content and who is involved as members and the way in which they may 
participate.  Initial conclusions from analysis of legislative governance highlight 
similarities and differences in the organisations involved in the two initiatives.  As 
both initiatives are part of the same value chain one may expect many of the same 
players to be involved, most obviously the exporters and importers.   
 
The standard developers in both HEBI and KenyaGAP sought to base their standards 
on an understanding of good practice in the local context.  The development of the 
HEBI standard began with an analysis of existing (external) social standards.  Whilst 
much of the motivation behind KenyaGAP was to gain acceptance in the market that 
local standards were equivalent with GlobalGAP, one of the main players in the 
development of the standard claims ‗we didn‘t want to bring a foreign document.  We 
documented what the farmers are doing and from this we developed the minimum of 
what you have to do‘ (interview).   
 
Both HEBI and KenyaGAP standards refer to national law.  Inclusion of national 
level detail, particularly locally appropriate indicators, has been important for the 
audit process so that there is less room for inconsistent interpretations by auditors not 
familiar with local conditions.  Both the HEBI code and the KenyaGAP standard 
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attempt to interpret international standards for local conditions and have managed in 
some cases to get acceptance of equivalence of outcome through divergent means.  A 
much celebrated success from the KenyaGAP benchmarking process has been 
recognition that a locked metal box is adequate storage for small producers who use 
only a small amount of pesticide, rather than the building specified in the original 
GlobalGAP criteria and indicators.  Another significant difference between the 
GlobalGAP and KenyaGAP standards is that the latter offers detailed guidance on 
how compliance may be achieved.  In the words of one stakeholder, GlobalGAP ‗tells 
people what they need to do…[but] they do not tell you how to do it.  They give you 
the exam but no reading material. With KenyaGAP we chose to say how to do it, 
which records the farmers need and what form and how to fill it in‘ (interview). 
 
 
As indicated in Box 2, the HEBI code sought to synthesise the social codes prevalent 
in the sector and identify best practice as well as linking the principles expressed in 
many codes with relevant Kenyan legislation, with a view to promoting not only 
compliance with externally defined rules, but also Kenyan law (Dolan and Opondo 
2005).  Many of the ideas have been gradually accepted as best practice by leading 
players in the industry, for example a spokesperson for the Kenya Flower Council 
notes how they have ‗borrowed‘ the idea of ‗gender committees‘ from HEBI‘s 
elaboration of the non-discrimination principle (interview). However the content of 
the code is only half the story for HEBI, the aim is for it to be complemented by a 
particular methodology which, according to a civil society stakeholder interviewee 
‗helps in getting the truth…Participatory social auditing – you get things you don‘t 
get with conventional approaches‘. (See next section on judicial governance). 
 
Both HEBI and KenyaGAP have been presented as multi-stakeholder, involving 
players from the private sector as well as civil society organisations and government.  
The development of HEBI can be traced directly to campaigns by local NGOs such as 
Kenya Women Workers Organisation (KEWWO), Kenya Human Rights Commission 
and Worker Rights Alert, which then linked up with international networks (such as 
Women Working Worldwide based in the UK), to raise awareness of the labour rights 
issues that were prevalent throughout the horticulture, particularly floriculture, 
industry.  This meant that exporters and then retailers decided that they could not 
longer act defensively but had to act to change practice (Dolan and Opondo 2005; 
Hale and Opondo 2005).  After years of conflict, NGOs and the private sector came 
together to form HEBI. 
 
HEBI thus aimed to bring the private sector to the table with its civil society critics.  
A key part of the structure of HEBI was for it to be led by two co-chairs, one from the 
private sector and one from civil society.  However, since the resignation of a 
representative of Kenya Human Rights Commission, leadership was dominated by the 
private sector, through a representative of the Agricultural Employers Association and 
latterly the Kenya Flower Council.  Civil society organisations have not been taken up 
the vacated co-chair role, and indeed some civil society members argue that their 
participation in the board since 2007 has been frustrated through being given very late 
notice of meetings and by requests to help fund the secretariat at levels which the 
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NGOs could ill afford (interviews).  The end of donor funding and lack of an income 
stream meant that the organisation had no office.  That the HEBI secretariat was 
temporarily housed in the offices of the Kenya Flower Council in 2007-08 is perhaps 
indicative of the private sector‘s influence over fate of the initiative. 
 
In recent years in GlobalGAP there has been an emphasis on local level interaction 
and the public private partnership that is embodied in the ‗national technical working 
groups‘, such as that behind KenyaGAP.  The chair of GlobalGAP stated that it is 
‗committed to building strong links to the public sector, and Non Governmental 
Organisations through public private partnership projects‘.11  One of the leading 
exporter associations in horticulture in Kenya that cuts across flowers, vegetable and 
fruit, FPEAK has led the development of KenyaGAP, but some NGOs, consultants 
and public sector stakeholders have been involved in the discussions. 
 
A very different set of NGOs have been associated with KenyaGAP compared to 
HEBI in which advocacy NGOs have predominated.  NGOs that have been associated 
with KenyaGAP tend to be organisations working on market access for small 
producers.  For example Fintrac (in its guise of Kenya Horticulture Development 
Program) and CARE (both of which are associate members of FPEAK) have been 
involved in initiatives to build capacity in GAP and promote certification and are the 
local offices of international NGOs, often funded by donors such as USAID.
12
  
Donors (such as DFID, GTZ and the EU-funded Pesticides Initiative Programme) 
have been acknowledged as important players in the development of KenyaGAP and 
the benchmarking process, not only for funding but also ‗creating a pool of 
knowledge‘ (Mbithi 2008b).   
 
In presentations on the KenyaGAP process, ‗farmers‘ as well as ‗exporters‘ are also 
listed as an important part of the process with regards to ‗investment, adoption of new 
techniques and group co-operation‘ (Garbutt 2007).  The ‗unique selling point‘ of 
KenyaGAP is reportedly its focus on interpreting and making GlobalGAP more 
accessible for the smaller producer. Increasingly FPEAK has presented itself as an 
organisation that can speak for smaller producers, is able to link small and larger 
producers and facilitate compliance with market needs (Mbithi 2008 and b; 
interviews).  Despite recent efforts at ‗outreach‘ to the thousands of smaller farmers 
who grow much of the fresh vegetable exports, small farmers themselves have not 
been involved in development of the KenyaGAP standard.  Our focus groups with 
smallholders that have achieved GlobalGAP certification revealed that neither they, 
nor their representatives, had been directly involved in any national level discussions 
about GAP standards, despite connections to NGOs and consultants concerned about 
the challenges of access to markets requiring certification.  Standards for food safety 
and good agricultural practice are presented by KenyaGAP and GlobalGAP, and to a 
                                                 
11
 Email to author 28 March 2008 
12
 Indeed Fintrac was the operating agency for the USAID Kenya Horticulture Development 
Programme and the UK‘s Department for International Development (DFID) hired a consultancy body 
to run its Business Services Market Development Programme (BSMDP) which was also highly 
involved in building capacity amongst horticultural producers to access markets requiring GAP 
certification. 
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certain extent by the bilateral donors, largely as a technical matter where stakeholders 
admitted to discussions are largely ‗technical experts‘, some of whom speak for 
smallholders who themselves do not have a voice. Legislative governance within 
KenyaGAP is relatively closed, open only to the invited participants.   
 
In theory HEBI has greater claims to be representative of workers whose interests the 
initiative purports to promote.  However, the issue of a voice for workers and 
representation in HEBI has been more complex in practice.  The involvement of trade 
unions was a critical part of the model on which HEBI was based, which draws on the 
experience of the Ethical Trading Initiative as multi-stakeholder initiative (Brown 
2005; Dolan and Opondo 2005; Blowfield 2002).  However antagonism between the 
sectoral union (Kenyan Plantation and Agricultural Workers Union, KPAWU) and 
local NGOs has meant that union representatives refused to take the seats on the 
Steering Committee reserved for them (Dolan and Opondo 2005) and there has been 
no union participation in HEBI Board meetings.  Indeed the union has had little 
contact with horticulture industry bodies, focusing its attention on the mechanisms for 
collective bargaining (interviews).  The lack of union participation creates a problem 
for the credibility of multi-stakeholder labour standards initiative.  As Blowfield and 
Dolan note ‗NGOs are designated proxies for workers' interests‘ (2008: 16).  The 
extent to which they have the capacity to act as advocates for workers is as yet 
unproven.  Despite considerable activity in the flower farm regions, particularly 
Naivasha around 2000-02 on the part of several NGOs, and the fact that NGO 
members of the HEBI board participated in awareness raising and pilot participatory 
audits in 2005-6, including more recent training, our worker FGDs indicated that few 
workers were aware of NGOs working on labour issues.
13
  Indeed workers were more 
aware of technical specifications for the produce than their rights. 
 
The conflict between trade unions and NGOs which has characterised much debate 
internationally on the role that codes of practice may play in protecting labour rights 
(Braun and Gerhart 2005) is particularly acute in Kenyan agriculture.  The level of 
unionisation on Kenyan commercial farms is relatively low, particularly among 
women (Riisgaard 2008; Dolan, Opondo and Smith 2003)
14
 and the relationship 
between leaders in the union movement and NGOs has been tarnished by conflicts of 
personalities and the influence of national politics.  NGOs and others (in key 
informant interviews and our stakeholder workshops) allege that the union has been 
too close to government to properly undertake its role as voice of the workers and the 
union jealously protects its official role in ‗social dialogue‘.   
 
Furthermore, the development of an effective working relationship between the NGO 
and business participants in HEBI has been hampered by a lack of trust. Many of the 
local NGOs involved in HEBI have roots in campaigning and there is a history of 
antagonism, and indeed conflict.  NGOs tell of being thrown off farms when 
attempting to train workers of their rights and to mobilise campaigns (interviews and 
                                                 
13
 This could be because workers are fearful of mentioning association with NGOs, especially since 
KEWWO for example is a membership organisation. 
14
 However on some flower farms, including some from which we interviewed workers levels of 
unionisation are over 80%. 
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workshops). The NGOs on the HEBI Board maintain an advocacy stance but some of 
the NGOs have since been invited onto farms for training sessions with worker rights, 
especially prior to the pilot social audits.  Moreover, KEWWO‘s recent research for 
Women Working Worldwide has acknowledged that significant improvements have 
taken place in the industry, particularly on the larger flower farms (Women Working 
Worldwide 2007).  Despite some thawing in the relationship, further challenges have 
emerged.  The departure of some key individuals from some civil society 
organisations and diverted attention of others (e.g. forays into national politics) has 
meant that some of the NGOs central to the formation of HEBI have played a less 
direct role in the recent years.   Civil society members of HEBI Board talk of ‗coming 
back‘ to HEBI, but it is not fully clear why they went away.  Was it related purely to 
capacity issues, or was there a sense that they were being squeezed out of an 
organisation that was being left to wither? 
 
Interviewees from Kenyan business have expressed disappointment that HEBI has not 
succeeded, some focusing on the loss of key individuals from the Board but also an 
apparent ‗bias‘ amongst ‗human rights activists‘.  At our workshop with Kenyan 
private sector stakeholders, participants argued that it was the because of the ‗market‘ 
that HEBI was ‗dying‘, rather than because of the action or inaction of local business.  
Whilst initially a catalyst for the founding of HEBI, some northern private sector 
players have tended to distance themselves from what they regard as the political 
problems of HEBI.  For example, one retailer, suggested: ‗We got the people round 
the table, decided that the issues should be solved in Kenya. [But there were] politics.  
Trade unions would only get involved if the NGOs were not there.  Who owns the 
rights of workers?  Because they didn‘t get the right structure, perhaps it was always 
doomed.‘ 
 
However, if the trade unions and NGOs had been able to work together within HEBI 
and if the original NGOs in the initiative had sufficient resources, both human and 
financial, would the story have been any different?  The answer partly depends on the 
way in which the private sector engages with the process, which we will discuss 
further under judicial and executive governance below.  It should be noted that the 
flower companies and KFC have not completely shunned NGOs, rather they have 
become more selective with civil society partners. To assist in social auditing KFC 
has recruited Africa Now
15
 to act on its independent certification committee and 
several companies have asked this NGO, through its Ethical Business Service, to train 
workers or conduct participatory social audits.  The private sector, both Kenyan 
horticulture firms and UK retailers, variously regard this organisation as ‗respected‘; 
‗a local resource‘; ‗great‘; a ‗livelihoods NGO, not advocacy‘ (unlike the HEBI 
member NGOs) and even ‗is our partner of choice‘.   
 
The sustainability of both KenyaGAP and HEBI is affected not only by the 
engagement or otherwise of players in Kenya, but also the involvement of donors.  
Donors have played an important role in the early stages of both initiatives.  Initial 
financing for HEBI came from DFID and the Royal Dutch Embassy and was 
                                                 
15
 Africa Now is registered in the UK but has a Nairobi office and was one of the original ‗observers‘ 
on the HEBI board rather than being a full member. 
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catalysed by the ETI secretariat and corporate members (Brown 2005), but the major 
donor did not renew funding when the production of a strategic plan was first delayed 
and then thought to be inadequate.  The interest of ETI corporate members was not 
sustained for long.
16
 
 
Donors contributed to the process of benchmarking KenyaGAP and have played an 
active role more generally in enabling smallholders to meet and be certified against 
GlobalGAP (Humphrey 2006 and 2008; raffham, Karehu and Macgregor 2007).  
Since benchmarking was achieved, KenyaGAP has been resourced largely through 
the efforts of FPEAK.  Current donor attention has moved to the standard setters at 
the international level rather assisting with local level certification and benchmarking 
processes e.g. the Africa Observer/ Smallholder Ambassador.
17
  
 
The use of outside resources for both initiatives raises questions regarding their 
sustainability.  Also questions may be raised regarding their democratic legitimacy in 
terms of their ability to include all relevant parties.  The extent to which those 
currently involved in KenyaGAP and also HEBI speak for or heed workers or small 
producers may be questioned.  Our findings suggest that whilst there is increasing 
awareness of standards amongst smaller farmers and workers, there is little sense that 
they may have a voice in standard setting even at the national level.   
 
Our analysis of legislative governance highlights how power has been exerted in 
terms of how the content of the standards has been developed and more significantly, 
who is participating.  At first sight, legislative governance with respect to HEBI has 
been more open as it is designed to be multi-stakeholder.  However, access to the 
private standard debate has been claimed by NGOs in HEBI, rather than the process 
being fully open.  And the space for dialogue has been constrained by the private 
sector.  In KenyaGAP the space for participation by actors outside the corporate 
private sector has been limited to NGOs and consultants deemed to have technical 
expertise. 
 
Judicial governance 
Judicial governance in relation to private standards is concerned with the auditing 
procedure – i.e. what compliance means, how it is assessed and certified.  In terms of 
judicial governance there are some key differences between our two cases.  For 
KenyaGAP, certification by an internationally accredited auditor is compulsory; this 
is critical if the assessment of compliance is to seen as equivalent to GlobalGAP‘s 
requirements.  The central tool within GlobalGAP, and hence KenyaGAP, is 
compliance with the standard, however, the chair of GlobalGAP when interviewed 
said that ‗Certification is not the be all and end all….it‘s about the practices…‘ 
(interview).  In contrast, HEBI places less emphasis on compliance with the standard 
than the institutionalisation of an approach to social auditing that tries to raise 
awareness of key stakeholders within the industry in order to promote improvements 
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 As early as 2006 members of ETI secretariat wondered if HEBI still existed in reality. 
17
 This initiative funded by DFID and GTZ began in 2007 with the aim of finding ways of increasing 
small holder representation in the standard setting process in GlobalGAP,  http://www.africa-
observer.info/index.html 
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in labour standards, drawing on ideas of participatory social auditing (PSA) (Auret 
and Barrientos 2002).  PSA focuses on the use of participatory interview techniques, 
especially focus groups using diagramming and drama, to elicit the concerns of 
workers, in contrast to the structured interview formats and document checks of 
standard social auditing (ibid).  The model adopted by HEBI also emphasised the 
witnessing of audits by civil society as an additional mechanism to improve ability of 
social audits to unearth underlying problems and identify solutions (Riisgaard 2008; 
workshops).   
 
Whilst there has been wide acceptance of the content of the HEBI standard as a guide 
on appropriate criteria and indicators, e.g. by KFC, it is with respect to judicial 
governance that there has been more overt conflict.  The KFC emphasises how it has 
improved its social auditing, e.g. through employment of female lead auditors and 
greater use of worker testimony.  However, PSA has not been accepted by industry 
players beyond initial participation in donor-funded pilots of the audit methodology, 
particularly in terms of civil society participation. For the KFC, this has been limited 
to one NGO (which is not involved in advocacy) sitting on its recently formed audit 
committee.   
 
A recent report by the ETI argues that there is a ‗growing crisis‘ in social auditing in 
retailer and brand name supply chains (ETI 2007).  On the one hand, social auditing is 
increasingly seen as wanting as it has not picked up continued labour abuses, even 
with respect to criteria that are relatively easy to monitor (such as excessive working 
hours) and incidents of audit fraud is increasingly widespread. On the other, there is 
also a widening gap between accepted good practice (participatory methods, worker 
interviews, inspection of records and triangulation of information) and the way in 
which the commercial social audit firms undertake social audits on behalf of retailers.   
 
Most UK retailers now expect their suppliers to submit audit data to SEDEX, the 
Supplier Ethical Trade Data Exchange.  This ultimately cuts the costs of an audit to 
suppliers by minimising duplication but the data handling requirements dictate an 
audit format that is quantitative and perfunctory suggest observers, including some in 
the private sector.  The retailers and certification bodies involved in SEDEX have 
developed a standardised social audit methodology, SMETA (SEDEX Member 
Ethical Trade Audit) which aims to facilitate transparency and set a baseline in terms 
of what social audit should entail.  Critics suggest that the SMETA approach is overly 
quantitative and reductionist; for example a representative of an ETI member 
company disparagingly described the as SMETA ‗five interviews and a photo‘. 
Another stakeholder pointed out that there is ‗there is no space for trade union and 
NGO help in corrective action‘ (interviews).  .   It is far from the PSA that HEBI and 
others have developed. 
 
Participatory approaches to social auditing are also threatened by the strengthening of 
the GlobalGAP standard‘s criteria on worker health, safety and welfare (WHSW)18 
and the experimentation with a ‗voluntary module‘ on social standards, GRASP 
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 Note that WHSW in the GlobalGAP standard is primarily concerned with occupational health rather 
than core labour rights. 
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(Good risk-based agricultural social practices).  GRASP is not a complete social audit 
and is described as a 'tested tool to support farmers demonstrating their legal social 
compliance with documentary evidence' and can help demonstrate that a good social 
management system exists on the farms.
19
  The emergence of GRASP demonstrates a 
managerial or technical approach to labour standards that leaves little room for the 
voice of workers.  Initial pilots to develop GRASP took place in 2005-6, including a 
preliminary test in Kenya and the idea has been revived in the past year as the private 
sectors‘ interest in more in-depth approaches has waned. 
 
With respect to judicial governance, KenyaGAP has followed GlobalGAP practice, 
focusing on the compliance approach.  In contrast, HEBI embraced more of a 
improving and learning approach to audit, embodied in PSA.  HEBI‘s audit 
methodology has had little uptake and whilst the industry body KFC has indicated 
that some of the indicators developed by HEBI have been adopted, the PSA 
methodology has not.  The limited space for worker and civil society voice in the 
dominant forms of social, and indeed food safety, auditing highlights the constraints 
on their agency in terms of judicial governance.   
 
Moreover, the evidence available to date also suggests that systems of judicial 
governance are relatively immature in that there is little information available on the 
right of appeal that the subjects of audit may have.  Whilst ‗close out‘ meetings at the 
end of an audit provide an opportunity to explain non-compliance, the decision of the 
certification body, on the recommendation of the auditor, is usually final, though there 
is a period of ‗grace‘ in which non-compliances can be rectified.20  A source of hidden 
power is in the accreditation process for certification bodies; an area for further 
investigation would be who decides who can audit and the process by which the 
criteria for a credible certification body are determined. 
 
Executive governance 
Under executive governance we have considered the expectations of retailers 
regarding GAP and labour standards and the response from the suppliers.  
Certification with GlobalGAP is a requirement for producers to enter into a supply 
relationship with UK (or Dutch) supermarkets.  It is the responsibility of the supplier 
to pay for and provide evidence of certification but retailers and importers may assist 
in the process by providing advice and information, especially for preferred suppliers 
(Humphrey 2006: 582).  Officially benchmarked standards such as KenyaGAP are 
also recognised as proof that the supplier has invested in appropriate systems to 
ensure that safe food is delivered.   However, it is widely recognised that Kenyan 
exporters have not used the benchmarked standard to the exclusion of GlobalGAP 
which it is supposed to replace (interviews; Mbithi 2008a).  This may cast doubt on 
the credibility of the benchmarking process within GlobalGAP.  Another explanation 
may be sought in interpreting GlobalGAP‘s interest in KenyaGAP, if not that of 
FPEAK, as a diversionary public relations exercise in the context of critical questions 
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 GRASP project final report and interview with one of the project officers, 11 December 2007. 
20
 HEBI had plans to develop a complaints handling procedure for the industry, but this has not been 
realised. 
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being asked at the WTO.
21
  In this light GlobalGAP‘s efforts to promote KenyaGAP 
can be seen as an effort to demonstrate that GlobalGAP was sensitive to the needs of 
developing country producers and not a non-tariff barrier, rather than a serious effort 
at benchmarking.  For FPEAK, KenyaGAP could also be seen as an exercise in self-
promotion, ensuring it remains relevant as an exporter association, especially in 
relation to its sometime rival and sometime partner, KFC, and also to attract funding 
from donors interested in promoting market access for small producers (Humphrey 
2008). 
 
Most UK supermarkets sourcing from Kenyan suppliers are members of ETI and have 
made a commitment to improving labour standards in their supply chain.  Social 
audits are required, often on the basis of a risk assessment.  They are frequently not as 
detailed as that dictated by the PSA methodology developed by HEBI, rather in recent 
years the SMETA system developed by SEDEX, as discussed above, has become the 
dominant approach.  Some supermarkets have regular supplier conferences (e.g. one 
run by Marks and Spencer in Kenya in October 2008) which aim to explain 
expectations with regard to good labour practices.  However as indicated by the 
continued debates about how purchasing practices constrain the implementation of 
codes of practice (Traidcraft 2007), the ethical trade aspirations of retailers do not 
always translate to their buying activities.  The signals from the retailers to producers 
can be mixed, as was apparent from our workshop with exporters and farmers.   
 
Nevertheless many of the Kenyan producers and exporters have of late been active in 
their support for social standards, especially when the gaze of civil society has been 
on them.  Participants in our workshops repeatedly highlighted the growth in Fairtrade 
certification amongst flower producers in Kenya as evidence of the importance of 
social standards.
22
  Other stakeholders highlighted however that Fairtrade certification 
has been driven by retailers who are responding to consumer demand for a 
recognisable label rather than being driven by a social agenda. 
 
But what of the HEBI standard?  Even if HEBI‘s civil society members and 
secretariat had maintained involvement beyond 2007, it seems however, that the 
outcome for the organisation may not have been much different given that private 
sector players were not prepared to wait for the organisation to mature.  Indeed, two 
private sector interviewees have indicated: 
 
―By the time there was a multi-stakeholder organisation in Kenya, the industry 
had recognised the problems and got on with fixing them … activities by the 
big managers of KFC and [UK horticulture companies]; they managed to 
squeeze all the social stuff into KFC gold; got the NGO part of Africa Now 
                                                 
21
 GlobalGAP, then EurepGAP was the subject of complaints from St Vincent and the Grenadines in 
WTO committees highlighting how its requirements were in excess of WTO approved international 
Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) standards in June 2005.  This has sparked a series of discussions on 
private standards at the SPS Committee of the WTO, and currently a Committee work programme 
comparing standards (Stanton 2009).  
22
 Indeed there has been a significant shift in the use of Fairtrade standards in Kenyan floriculture from 
one or two firms in 2002 (Dolan et al 2003) to around 18 certified farms and two certified traders in 
December 2008 (FLO website; interview). 
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involved and Bureau Veritas overseeing.  In 8 weeks it was all done and 
dusted and HEBI had not even decided where to meet….‖  
 
―…[but for the larger retailers], HEBI could not offer the capacity to 
audit. …HEBI [had to learn to] fly quite quickly….[but as it took time] 
companies have had to use alternatives.‖ 
 
Other approaches to tackling social issues were seen as more ‗expedient‘. HEBI was 
quickly side-lined. 
 
 
Governance and Kenyan PSIs 
HEBI and KenyaGAP exist as both standards and institutions with roots in Kenya.  
Both initiatives were supported from the outside as part of the trend in the early 2000s 
to localise standards which can be seen as a response to the arguments that the 
governance of standards was too far removed from the locus of implementation.  That 
is, they had failed to identify the real issues in the workplace confronting labour (for 
HEBI) or were creating a barrier to market access (KenyaGAP).  By 2005 HEBI was 
legally registered and had a draft strategic plan; KenyaGAP was successfully 
benchmarked with GlobalGAP in 2007.   
 
However, both have faced challenges in terms of how they have been accepted by 
influential private sector actors.  The KenyaGAP standard is not being used as a 
certificate that can substitute for GlobalGAP despite the benchmarking process.  The 
secretariat of FPEAK increasingly speaks about the value of KenyaGAP less in terms 
of certification than its strength in promoting good agricultural practices throughout 
the industry through the use of supporting tools such as a the quality management 
template. By early 2009 public statements focused on KenyaGAP Local, a pared 
down standard aimed at promoting safe food in supply chains for local supermarkets 
(Mbithi 2009; interviews). 
 
Whilst the content of the HEBI code has had widespread acceptance with parts being 
included in auditor guides and checklists used by social auditors operating in Kenya, 
the audit methodology recommended by HEBI is heeded by few.   Moreover, HEBI 
has faced a management and funding crisis; since 2006 HEBI was relatively inactive 
as there were problems in recruiting an effective staff for the secretariat and 
influential members of the board took on other roles outside of the sector leaving 
vacancies.  Some of the remaining board members were pre-occupied with 
campaigning in the national elections of December 2007 whilst, according to a long-
time member of the HEBI board, ‗new faces at HEBI are grappling with 
understanding what HEBI is all about‘ (stakeholder interview).  The issue seems 
rather that there are very different visions of what an organisation like HEBI can and 
should be.  Indeed, this seemed to have been its problem from the very start. 
 
By mid 2008 civil society board members were committed to reviving HEBI 
organisation. They wanted to retain the space for dialogue that had been created but 
which they claimed had been ‗killed‘ by the private sector.  Certainly, there is 
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considerable evidence that the vision of HEBI that the civil society organisations has 
been quashed by private sector players.  We can see this through the power in 
legislative governance (cancelled board meetings, appointment of an ineffectual 
project manager), and judicial governance (side-lining of PSA) and executive 
governance, i.e.  by the growers as ‗the market‘ did not recognise it.  The high profile 
of GlobalGAP in Kenya (as a concern of the industry, donors and the government, as 
demonstrated by the focus of the National Taskforce on Horticulture) and the 
emergence of KenyaGAP have meant that HEBI has been increasingly over-
shadowed; key industry players that were involved in HEBI have been pre-occupied 
with dialogue on food safety and GAP.  More fundamental however is a lack of 
clarity as to the purpose of HEBI: should it be an auditing body or rather a body 
aimed at promoting best practice in the work place and remediating problems or 
raising awareness of worker rights?   
 
KenyaGAP to date seems to be more adept at reinventing itself.  Now that the 
GlobalGAP standard has been revised again, meaning that the KenyaGAP standard 
needs to be re-benchmarked, FPEAK‘s focus has been less on certification than on 
advocating a systems-based approach for good agricultural practice that links to 
government mechanisms for food safety in the context of domestic as well as export 
markets. 
 
Our examination of KenyaGAP and HEBI thorough the lens of legislative, judicial 
and executive governance has revealed the interplay of actors both directly and 
indirectly involved in the value chain.  Certain non-chain actors can play a role in 
legislative governance, and, to a certain extent, judicial governance (e.g. donor 
support to African certification bodies and raising of the profile, if not acceptance, of 
participatory social auditing).  Civil society actors have played a role in legislative 
governance, shaping the content of the standards particularly at the indicator level, 
offering insights into local conditions which can influence how certain criteria are 
interpreted by both producers and auditors.  Civil society actors involved in HEBI had 
hoped to have a role in judicial governance through their promotion of participatory 
social auditing.  It seems however that certification bodies and the private sector have 
taken those aspects of PSA that they find useful and have ignored the more 
transformative aspects.  However, executive governance, i.e. influencing co-
ordination within the chain and specifically the selection of tools with which to co-
ordinate, which is based on private sector power, tends to be beyond the reach of most 
actors involved in the PSIs.  Exporters decide ultimately which standards to pursue in 
their business, but the factors which ultimately dictate the choice of standard and 
mode of their implementation originate further down the chain.  The rationale that the 
private sector players provide for their choices are couched in the language of 
pragmatism and technical requirements.  With respect to the participation of civil 
society for example, NGOs are seen as a resource, a source of technical expertise, 
highlighting a concern with output rather than democratic legitimacy.  It is a particular 
concern that the space for dialogue has been constrained in a context where trade 
union activity has had limited effect. 
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Conclusions 
This paper reviews and applies an evolving conceptual framework that aims to 
examine the governance implications of southern PSIs by bringing together an 
expanded value chain framework.  Our aim is to facilitate analysis of PSIs that 
includes both vertical and horizontal aspects of governance that is able to capture the 
political and institutional dynamics of PSIs, in order to get a better picture of how 
private standards affect local dynamics and the extent to which players lower down 
the value chain, including workers and small producers, are able to influence value 
chain governance.   
 
The discussion in this paper has indicated that it is with respect to legislative 
governance in particular, and to a lesser extent judicial governance, that the horizontal 
dimensions of governance are apparent, that is, a range of actors from outside the 
value chain have contributed to debates about the content of standards.  However, in 
terms of executive governance, the dominance of the ‗vertical‘ aspects of governance 
is apparent; it is the private sector players who have most influence, though other 
actors in the chain, most directly the importers but also other actors such as donors, 
through their provision and indeed withdrawal of support for the standards initiatives, 
shape the debates. Governance is exercised ‗beyond the vertical‘ in that one can 
identify wider horizontal processes of governance, including how the scope of key 
debates is constructed (especially in legislative governance) but analysis of executive 
governance emphasises the dominant role of the lead buyers.  Indeed PSIs must be 
considered in the context of the other forms of co-ordination in the value chain and in 
the context of ‗whole chain governance‘.   
 
It seems that the potential of PSIs to enhance democratic governance is limited and is 
dependent upon space being granted by private sector players.  It seems that only 
certain kinds of civil society organisation are welcome to participate in PSIs, ones that 
deliver a service to the private sector as auditors or remediate problems, as opposed to 
advocacy or representative organisations.  However our cases do not suggest that the 
role of government is being usurped, on the contrary, the KenyaGAP example 
suggests that private governance has stimulated parts of the Kenyan government to act 
in a more co-ordinated way to promote the production and sale of safe food.  However, 
our preliminary analysis of these two PSIs must be supplemented by more detailed 
analysis of the discourse around private standards, particularly in the international 
context. 
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